

# Supplementary Materials for: Qualitative Imputation of Missing Potential Outcomes

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## A Full Dataset

In this section, we share the full datasets for the end of conflict and democratization cases. The “observed” portion of the dataset refers to the data as revealed by the world. If  $d_i = 0$ , then the observation did not receive a truth commission, but if  $d_i = 1$ , the observation did experience a truth commission. The  $Y_i$  column refers to the observed outcome. For the end of conflict cases,  $Y_i = 1$  means that violence resumed within 10 years after the end of a conflict and  $Y_i = 0$  means that it did not. In the democratization cases,  $Y_i = 1$  means that the country returned to an authoritarian regime, and  $Y_i = 0$  means that it did not. From the observed data  $d_i$  and  $Y_i$ , we can infer which of the potential outcomes  $Y_i(0)$  and  $Y_i(1)$  we know and which we do not. The “imputed” portion of the dataset shows our best guess on the basis of the available information what we think would have happened if the treatment indicator had been set to the opposite value. We call these imputed outcomes  $\tilde{Y}_i(0)$  and  $\tilde{Y}_i(1)$ . The implied treatment effect  $\tilde{\tau}_i$  is the difference between them.

Table A.1: End of Conflict Cases

Step 1: Disbanded and Discredited	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
Nepal - CPN-M (1966-2006)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Sri Lanka - LTTE (1984-2009)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Serbia (Yugoslavia) - Croatia (1991-1991)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Serbia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) (1998-1999)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Step 2: Treated Cases	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
El Salvador - FMLN (1979-1991)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Indonesia - East Timor (1997-1999)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Liberia (2000-2003)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone (1991-2001)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Peru - Shining Path (1982-1999)	1	1	?	1	1	1	0
Uganda (1962-1986)	1	1	?	1	1	1	0
Step 3: Non-transitional Cases	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
Burundi (1991-2008)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Sri Lanka - JVP (1971-1990)	1	0	0	?	0	0	0
Step 4: Untreated Cases	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
South Africa - Namibia (1966-1988)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Cambodia (Kampuchea) (1979-1998)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
United Kingdom - Northern Ireland (1998-1998)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
India - Punjab (1983-1993)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-1994)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0

Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Myanmar (Burma) - Arakan (1948-1994)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Myanmar (Burma) - Kachin (1961-1992)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Thailand (1974-1982)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Bangladesh (1975-1997)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Angola (1998-2002)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Nicaragua (1982-1990)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
India - Nagaland (1992-1997)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
United Kingdom.- Northern Ireland (1971-1991)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
Angola (1975-1995)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
Liberia (1989-1990)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
India - Manipur (1982-1988)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
India - Assam (1983-1990)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0

Step 5: Unimputable Cases

	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
Iran (1946-1996)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Yemen (North Yemen) (1979-1982)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Lebanon (1958-1990)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Laos (1959-1990)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Iraq (1961-1996)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Ethiopia (1976-1991)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Indonesia - ELF (1965-1984)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Syria (1979-1982)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Guinea (2000-2001)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Morocco (1975-1989)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Mozambique (1977-1992)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Indonesia - Aceh (1999-2005)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Yemen (North Yemen) (1994-1994)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Pakistan (1990-1996)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Congo (Brazzaville) (1993-2002)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Israel (2006-2006)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Iraq (1982-1996)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Ethiopia (1976-1983)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Indonesia - Aceh (1990-1991)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Rwanda (1990-2002)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Senegal (1988-2003)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Georgia (1992-1993)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Tajikistan (1992-1999)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Israel (1990-1999)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?

Table A.2: Democratization Cases

Step 1: Disbanded and Discredited	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
Bolivia (1967-1982)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Philippines (1973-1986)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Step 2: Treated Cases	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
Argentina (1977-1983)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Chad (1982-1990)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Chile (1974-1989)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Guatemala (1986-1995)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Nepal - Panchayat (1952-1991)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Nigeria (1994-1999)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka (1979-1994)	1	0	?	0	0	0	0
South Africa (1911-1994)	1	0	?	0	1	0	-1
Haiti (1992-1994)	1	1	?	1	1	1	0
Step 3: Non-transitional Cases	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
Brazil (1965-1985)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Ghana (1982-1993)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Korea (South) (1962-1987)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Paraguay (1955-1993)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Panama (1983-1989)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Uruguay (1974-1984)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Thailand (2007-2007)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
Step 4: Untreated Cases	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
El Salvador (1983-1994)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Haiti (2000-2004)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Liberia (1998-2003)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Mexico (1916-2000)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Nepal (2003-2006)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Peru - Fujimori (1993-2000)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Serbia (1992-2000)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Sierra Leone (1997-1998)	0	0	0	?	0	0	0
Honduras (1973-1981)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Nicaragua (1980-1990)	0	0	0	?	0	1	1
Burundi (1997-2003)	0	0	1	?	1	1	0
Burundi (1988-1993)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0

Central African Rep (1982-1993)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
Sierra Leone (1992-1996)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
Thailand (1977-1988)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0
Thailand (1992-1992)	0	1	1	?	1	1	0

Step 5: Unimputable Cases

	Observed				Imputed		
	$d_i$	$Y_i$	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(0)$	$\tilde{Y}_i(1)$	$\tilde{\tau}_i$
Albania (1945-1991)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Azerbaijan (1992-1992)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Bangladesh (2008-2008)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Benin (1973-1990)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Bulgaria (1945-1990)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Congo (Brazzaville) (1969-1991)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Czechoslovakia (1949-1989)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Georgia (1993-2003)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Guinea (2009-2010)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Guinea-Bissau (2003-2003)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Hungary (1948-1990)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Indonesia (1967-1999)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Kenya (1964-2002)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Lesotho (1987-1993)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Madagascar (1976-1993)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Malawi (1965-1994)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Mali (1969-1991)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Mongolia (1922-1993)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Niger (1997-1999)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Pakistan (1978-1988)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Pakistan (2000-2008)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Peru - Military (1969-1980)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Poland (1945-1989)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Romania (1946-1989)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Senegal (1961-2000)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Sudan (1986-1986)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Taiwan (1950-2000)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Turkey (1981-1983)	0	0	0	?	0	?	?
Bangladesh (1983-1990)	0	0	1	?	1	?	?
Guinea-Bissau (1981-1999)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Haiti (1989-1990)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Niger (1975-1991)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?
Zambia (1968-1991)	0	1	1	?	1	?	?

## B End of Conflict Imputations

In this section, we share our reasoning for the each imputation in the end of conflict cases. These imputations come from a reading of the available literature on each case. We grant that others may come to different conclusions, but we offer our reasoning here for others to consider.

### B.1 Step 1: Disbanded and Discredited Cases

1. **Nepal (1966-2006) (post-civil war)** Nepal announced a truth commission following the war but it was disbanded before it began functioning. Nevertheless, the outcome has been a continuation of peace. The observed data is therefore  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ , which implies that had the truth carried to completion, violence would also not have resumed. We conclude this based on studies by International Center for Transitional Justice (2014); Fajardo and Farasat (2008); Sajjad (2015); Billingsley (2019); Bakiner (2015); International Commission of Jurists (2014) and Ginsbach (2014), who chart the post-conflict politics of Nepal after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA), which brought a formal end to the war in 2006. These studies find that even though both sides agreed to form a truth commission, the Maoist-led coalition government formed after the April 2008 elections were reluctant to engage with any mechanisms of transitional justice. Civilians continued to express hope in transitional justice despite allegations of a lack of civil society involvement in the early stages. In two surveys conducted on representative populations in Nepal, about 65 percent of civilians had heard of the TTC and many the of respondents viewed the establishment of the truth as the first step in addressing human-rights violations that took place during the conflict (Robins, 2009; Russell, 2012). The bill drafted by the government to set up the TTC in 2013, however, drew wide criticism from civil society, human rights activists, and national and international rights agencies. This was because the bill granted wide-ranging discretionary powers to recommend blanket amnesties for perpetrators of serious human rights violations. As a result, the ordinance to create the truth commission was struck down by a Supreme Court ruling in 2014. In April 2016, almost a decade after the signing of the CPA, the commission began inviting complaints, though many of the flawed provisions from the original ordinance remained and the commission has made very limited progress (Jeffery, 2019). Because the failure to establish a TTC was due to the subordination of transitional justice aims to political deadlock and crucially (and not out of fear of renewed violence) we believe that had a truth commission actually been instituted, it would not have worsened conflict outcomes.
2. **Sri Lanka 2010 (post-civil war)** Sri Lanka instituted a “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission” following state victory in the decades-long civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This commission was instituted as a means to deflect international pressure to investigate human rights violations (International Crisis Group, 22 December 2011). It was widely denounced as a sham given its limited mandate, its lack of independence, and its whitewashing of state culpability for casualties (Thiranagama, 2013). Human rights organizations also criticized the commission for “failing to meet basic international standards for independent and impartial inquires” and deemed unlikely that its work would lead to any serious investigations into government atrocities during the war (Höglund and Orjuela, 2011; Yasmin Sooka, 2019). Human Rights Watch issued a strong condemnation

of the commission’s final report, stating that “Governments and UN bodies have held back for the past 18 months to allow the Sri Lankan commission to make progress on accountability . . . [But] the commission’s failure to provide a road map for investigating and prosecuting wartime perpetrators shows the dire need for an independent, international commission” (Watch, 2011). Hence, it is marked as treatment  $d_i = 0$ . Despite this, the outcome has been no civil war resumption, which is  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . In an alternative setting, where such a commission would have conducted an independent investigation, the conflict would not have recurred. Höglund and Orjuela (2011) writes that “a recurrence of war is unlikely in the immediate future given the near annihilation of the LTTE.” In this setting, had an independent truth commission been created, we believe that that the probability of renewed violence would have only plummeted further.

3. **Yugoslavia (Serbia) – Croatia (1991-1991) (post-civil war)** During his tenure from 2000-2004, Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Račan in response to pressures to cooperate with a domestically unpopular International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), launched a perfunctory truth commission. This commission was apparently aimed at lessening Western pressure for criminal accountability while simultaneously avoiding transfers of perpetrators to the Hague (Grodsky, 2009). Those in charge of the project worked in relative isolation with no input from local or international civil society. For all practical purposes, this project was invisible. Even after it completed its work, it was given no access to a popular domestic audience, making its findings irrelevant on a local stage. Instead, the few political elites who had heard of the project dismissed it as a mere “symbolic gesture” for Western consumption (Grodsky, 2011). As a result, we marked treatment as 0 and the observed outcome was no conflict resumption i.e.,  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . Even if an independent truth commission had been carried out, conflict would not have resumed. We make this imputation because in later years, a few new initiatives to document the truth (including the popular civil-society initiative RECOM) gained momentum and considerable interest throughout the former Yugoslavia without a resumption of conflict (Jeffrey and Jakala, 2012). In light of these experiences, it is unlikely that an independently conducted original commission would have stoked renewed conflict.
4. **Serbia – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1998-2000) (post-civil war)** After the breakup of the former Yugoslavia into several independent states, the ouster and arrest of Slobodan Milošević in late 2000, and immense Western pressure to cooperate with the ICTY, the newly elected president of Serbia inaugurated the Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The commission’s mandate was to investigate war crimes committed in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo in the previous two decades. However, the commission was disbanded in 2003. For this reason, we consider this case untreated. The outcome was no conflict resumption, so the revealed data are  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$  and  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . Based on studies by Hayner (2010); Ostojić (2013); Pejić (2001); Grodsky (2009); Council of Europe (2012), we believe that had the truth commission been completed, conflict risk would not have increased. This is because first, the reasons for the disbanding of the truth commission had nothing to do with fears of renewed conflict. Instead, it was annulled when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was transformed into Serbia and Montenegro in early 2003. Its existence relied on a mandate from the Federal Presidency (an office eliminated with the end of the Federal Republic), so the commission closed without having conducted a

single public hearing. Second, the commission, even before it was disbanded, was considered “weak and ineffective” (Hayner, 2010), a rushed exercise conducted “to delay politically costly transfers. . . [that] was received by pro-justice actors as a sham,” and one that “was doomed, unfortunately, to fail” (Grodsky, 2009). This failure was a result of many concerns. These included the absence of ethnic diversity on the staff, lack of political will for serious inquiry into past truths, perceived bias in favor of the new President, and opposition by societal groups and human rights organizations. It was obvious that many of these problems were germane to the commission design, leading scholars to conclude that “the hasty creation of the Yugoslav truth commission was meant to make up for the lack of cooperation with The Hague tribunal at a moment when the authorities in Belgrade had not even proceeded with the arrest of Slobodan Milošević” (Ostojić, 2013). Finally, over the following years, a number of initiatives to document the truth (including a civil-society initiative towards a regional truth commission) and gain justice (such as the ICTY) gained momentum and considerable interest throughout the former Yugoslavia without a resumption of conflict (Jeffrey and Jakala, 2012), making it clear that truth-finding was not at odds with peace in the country. Given the critique of the truth commission from multiple quarters during its progression, the reasons for its disbandment, and coexisting attempts at investigating the past, it is unlikely that the truth commission would have heightened future conflict potential, even if it had it been carried to completion.

## B.2 Step 2: Treated Cases

### 1. El Salvador - FMLN (1979-1991) (post-civil war)

The outcome in El Salvador was no return to conflict following a truth commission, hence ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$  as well. We believe that if El Salvador had not instituted a truth commission, its conflict potential would have been no worse. We conclude this based on our reading of a series case-specific studies (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995; Bakiner, 2015; Jowdy, 1997; Rachel et al., 2013). These authors analyze the workings of the truth commission to point to various issues with the commission. These include (a) legitimacy concerns arising from heavy external involvement of international actors at the expense of local participation; (b) the commission’s selective investigation of only 32 symbolic cases; (c) the government’s official rejection of and establishment of blanket amnesty in response to the commission’s report; (d) the lack of professional consequences for public officials named in the report; (e) continued resistance to provide information arising from the involvement of a still-strong military. While the truth commission does not appear to have had any harmful effects *per se*, it has also not had any significant positive impact (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p. 102).

- ### 2. Indonesia – East Timor (1997-1999) (post-civil war)
- Upon East Timor’s independence from Indonesia, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UN-TAET) established a truth commission. Civil war did not resume, so the revealed data are ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ) and so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ . We believe that the truth commission did not cause the sustenance of peace in this case. We base our conclusion on a reading of history of the conflict (McCloskey and Hainsworth, 2000; Webster, 2007), conditions of truth commission establishment (Stahn, 2001; Burgess, 2004; Nannelli, 2009;



Roosa, 2007) and domestic responses to the commission (Le Touze et al., 2005; Ziftak, 2005; Kent, 2005). These studies find two things: first, conflict potential was already extremely low given that the movement had achieved its secessionist goals. After gaining independence from Indonesia, the truth commission was set up as part of the internationally mediated peace process. In this relatively stable context, even though civilians and officials had mixed attitudes towards the truth commission, its work did not increase conflict potential. Truth commission personnel reported that most victims were able to participate in and gain relief from the commission’s community reconciliation exercises. At the same time, civilian-focused reports have revealed ambivalent feelings (such as anger, lack of closure, re-traumatization) among victims about both the process and the results of the commission. Second, they show that the truth commission was only one of four tiers of accountability and justice mechanisms set up in Indonesia and East Timor at the time of transition. This approach included separate, parallel structures to investigate and prosecute serious crimes (also set up by UNTAET), making it unlikely that the truth commission was able to have an independent impact.

3. **Liberia (2000-2003) (post-civil war)** The outcome was no civil war resumption: ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ . In this case, we believe that if Liberia had not instituted a truth commission, it would still not have experienced a repeat of civil war violence. The main reason for our conclusion is our reading of Hayner (2007a), James-Allen et al. (2010) and Sirleaf (2009). These authors rely on interviews with participants of the peace negotiation and local experts through the transitional justice processes in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, to conclude that the truth commission was unable to have a considerable effect. They find that (a) the commission was created by rebel factions specifically to avoid criminal prosecution through the war crimes tribunal, which was the proposed alternative; (b) recommendations from the Truth Commission were not implemented for multiple reasons despite repeated promises from political leaders; (c) there were serious conflicts of interest between the overlapping mandates of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Truth Commission in Sierra Leone and the Truth Commission in Liberia. In a setting where the truth commission was created to avoid more serious investigation and even then was unable to complete its work without interference or implement its recommendations, it is improbable that the commission had any conflict-reducing impact.
4. **Sierra Leone (1991-2001) (post-civil war)** Sierra Leone established a truth commission at transition and the outcome was no civil war resumption: ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ . In this case, we believe that if Sierra Leone had not instituted a truth commission, it would still not have experienced a repeat of civil war violence. This is based on findings in the case-specific literature that (a) the provision of full amnesty for all sides was seen by the rebels as a pre-condition for a peace agreement to end the conflict (Hayner, 2007b); (b) the Truth Commission’s reach was limited to urban areas (Cilliers et al., 2016) and focus group discussions reveal a widespread belief that local methods of reconciliation would have been more successful (Sesay, 2007); (c) ongoing potential for violence and lack of mechanisms to solve conflicts between the Special Court and the Truth Commission (Dougherty, 2004).
5. **Peru - Shining Path (1982-1999) (post-civil war)** Peru experienced both, a democratic transition and transition from civil war in the time period under consideration. Even though the end of the Fujimori regime presented a political opening for the truth commission to

be established (Bakiner, 2015), the commission’s mandate covered the civil war specifically. As a result, we consider the post authoritarian period in Peru as untreated. The outcome was a return to civil war, so  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 1)$ , so  $Y_i(1) = 1$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 1$ : in this case, we believe that even if Peru had not instituted a truth commission, conflict would have resumed anyway – the truth commission did not contribute to conflict recurrence. Our conclusion relies on our reading of Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena (2006), (Bakiner, 2013) and (Laplante and Theidon, 2007), who analyze the workings of the commission to find that the Peruvian truth commission enjoyed a high level of political and popular support, collected a huge amount of evidence and immediately published a widely disseminated final report. While the lack of funds allocated to it and the slow pace of implementation of the recommended reparations program caused outrage among some organizations, civil society groups have succeeded in moving the process forward. In all, such issues with the Truth Commission do not seem to have made things worse so as to catalyze a resurgence in conflict.

6. **Uganda (post-civil war)** Following its transition from civil war in 1986, Uganda set up a truth commission (the Ugandan Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (CIVHR)). The outcome was a resumption of conflict, thus  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 1)$ , and  $Y_i(1) = 1$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 1$ . We believe that even if Uganda had not instituted a truth commission, the state would have returned to conflict. This imputation is based on analyses by the International Center for Transitional Justice (2012); Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010). These reports find that while the truth commission was established to provide a decisive break with Uganda’s history of ethnic conflict, “there is little evidence to suggest the CIVHR has contributed to Uganda’s democratic progress in any significant way” (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p. 116). Any commitment to accountability was overshadowed by continued ethnic conflict and competing development needs, leaving the commission institutionally weak, marginalized and starved of resources soon after it began its work. Consequently, the commission took a decade to complete its work (during which time public interest had dissipated and Uganda was faced with a new human rights catastrophe). The findings and recommendations from the resulting report were not made available to anyone outside the government, which in turn has strong incentives to resist any pressure to enact substantial reform. Instead, most of the perpetrators remain at large and have never been held accountable for alleged crimes, and many victims have never been recognized nor received justice. Given that the NRA government’s tenure had intentionally been left out of the truth commission’s mandate and that its leader Museveni has relied on increasingly undemocratic tactics to remain in power, Quinn (2004) contends that the creation of the truth commission itself was at least in part motivated by a desire to placate external critics. Given a situation where violence and political unwillingness (by a government that continued to undermine democracy) hampered the commission, we believe that the absence of a truth commission would be able to do little to prevent a resumption of fighting.

### B.3 Step 3: Non-Transitional Cases

1. **Burundi (1991-2008) (post-civil war)** Burundi experienced no transitional truth commission, though a non-transitional one eventually created in 2014, over a decade after plans for a Truth Commission were first laid out in the Arusha Agreement of 2000. The outcome was no resumption of conflict at conventional civil war levels. Therefore  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$  and

$Y_i(0) = 0$ . In this case, we imputed  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . We believe that if Burundi had established a truth commission at the time of an already fraught transition, it would have returned to violence. We conclude this based on two pieces of evidence: first, our reading of the history of the conflict and its numerous failed attempts at a peace accord (Falch and Becker, 2008; Amnesty International, 2015) signal that tensions continued even after the violence ended and the potential for a return to conflict was very high regardless of truth commission setup. Second, studies of attitudes of the international community and civilians towards a truth commission make it clear that a truth commission was not high on the list of priorities and came with risks to peace. For instance, Vandeginste (2012) finds that the (late) timing of the truth commission’s establishment comes as no surprise given the difficulties of transition and the leadership’s explicit priority of “Peace First, Truth and Justice Later.” Further, he finds that the top priorities for Burundi’s international partners were the cessation of hostilities and the return of political stability. That is, they did not consider transitional justice as an urgent need since it carried the risk of derailing the fragile transition toward peace, security and stability. Further, Samii (2013) finds, based on a 2007 survey of civilians, that the bulk of the population would rather forgive and forget than to seek the truth by investigating the conflict. Even when a truth commission was finally initiated, it polarized domestic opinion and was criticized by civil society (Rugiririza, 2016). In light of these analyses, we believe that a transitional truth commission could have made a fraught transition worse.

2. **Sri Lanka - JVP (1971-1990) (post-civil war)** While there was no commission specific to the civil war, the three interlinked commissions of inquiry established in 1995 also covered the period of civil war and conflict-related involuntary removal and disappearances in its mandate. As a result, this case follows the same logic as Sri Lanka (1979-1994) (post authoritarian), discussed below. The outcome was no resumption of the JVP insurrection, so  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ , and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$  as well.

#### B.4 Step 4: Untreated Cases

1. **South Africa - Namibia (1966-1988) (post-civil war)** The South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) conflict in South Africa ended with Namibian independence. No truth commission was established at the time of transition, and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict. Therefore,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . Based on a reading of Dobell (1997), we believe a truth commission in the face of state unwillingness would have caused a return to instability. Newly-independent Namibia’s President, who was also an ex-SWAPO commander, rejected multiple calls by domestic as well as international civil society groups for a truth commission. In analyzing the silence that took hold around questions of accountability, Dobell writes “In the government’s considered opinion, resurrecting the past would serve no constructive purpose. A successful transition, it was argued, required cooperation among former enemies. Delving into past injustices would only incite a desire for vengeance and distract a still-fragile nation from the paramount tasks of reconstruction and development . . . An unspoken but critical subtext for what detractors derided as a policy of national amnesia was the SWAPO leadership’s uncomfortable awareness of the skeletons in its own closet” (Dobell, 1997, p. 373). In this situation, state attempts to investigate the past carried the risk of political backlash and potential for return to violence.

2. **Cambodia (Kampuchea) (1979-1998) (post-civil war)** Cambodia did not establish a truth commission after the end of its conflict, and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict. In other words,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$  which means that a truth commission would not have undermined the potential for continued peace. This is because first, conflict renewal potential was quite low regardless of truth commission setup: “after the influential leader Pol Pot died in 1998 and the last senior members of Khmer Rouge surrendered, the threat of renewed violence by the group effectively ended” UCDP (2018b). Further, Klosterman (1998) argues that even though there is a vast amount of documentation and physical proof of the widespread abuses of the Khmer Rouge regime, the international community should establish an investigatory truth commission: “such a commission would enable Cambodians to expose the criminal workings of the Khmer Rouge, while setting the foundation for a possible international criminal trial in the future. Establishing an official historical record of the Khmer Rouge atrocities would also prevent the events from being downgraded or denied. A truth commission in Cambodia may also serve the emotional needs of Cambodians, allowing them to bring closure to that brutal era” [p. 833-844].
3. **United Kingdom - Northern Ireland (1998-1998) (post-civil war)** In 1998, following another bombing campaign, all parties taking part in peace negotiations approved the Good Friday Agreement, effectively ending the civil war. No truth commission was established and outcome has been no resumption of civil conflict:  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that a truth commission would not have endangered sustained peace, or  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . This is based on our reading of Connolly (2006) who explains that first, there have been multiple official attempts at truth-seeking in Northern Ireland since 1997 (the Report of the Northern Ireland Victims’ Commissioner, a series of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry). While all of these efforts have fallen short in different ways, they prove that the investigation of the past is widely considered a peace-reinforcing exercise. Second, Connolly (2006) advises that the implementation of a state-sponsored truth commission would be crucial to Northern Ireland’s peace process, and would serve as an important example for other societies undergoing similar processes of conflict resolution. In light of this analysis, the truth commission would not have caused a return to violence.
4. **India - Punjab (1983-1993) (post-civil war)** In 1993, the secessionist war in Punjab ended with a state victory and militant attrition. No truth commission was established and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict:  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$  or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed  $Y_i(1) = 0$ , implying that the establishment of a truth commission would not have caused a return to conflict based on reports by Singh (2002); Kumar (2003); Silva et al. (2009); Surya (2016); Amnesty International (1995). These reports make clear first, that investigative efforts to account for insurgency-related disappearances were conducted by civilians and NGOs both during the conflict (with often fatal repercussions for initiators) and after. These attempts have included multiple reports by international and domestic organizations, documentaries, a people’s commission, electoral platforms, memorials for “martyrs” of the conflict and have together succeeded in establishing some measure of the truth – all without a resurgence of conflict. Second, while the state and its official courts have refused to cooperate with any of these attempts out of security concerns, it has established ten event-specific judicial Commissions of Inquiry to look into the particularly violent anti-Sikh riots of 1984. While

these commissions have proven largely inconclusive (Human Rights Watch, 2014), it is clear that the state is not concerned about a resumption of ethnic tensions with an inquiry. If anything, an official truth commission would only have served to further reduce conflict potential: while the observed outcome is no resumption at civil war threshold, low-level tensions have persisted. These tensions have manifested in the form of popular calls for a new separatist referendum across the diaspora and exacerbated contemporary problems in the state. In this context, delayed initiatives for closure and lack of cooperation with demands for the truth have extended a new lease of life to an undercurrent of extremist and fundamentalist political tendencies (Donthi, 2019; Kumar, June 23, 2018; Editorial Letter, 2016). Given these considerations, it is unlikely that a truth commission would have prevented continued peace in the state.

5. **Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) (post-civil war)** While international-level discussions of a truth commission were part of the Dayton Peace Accords that signaled an end to the war, such a commission was not established. The outcome was no return to conflict, i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . We do this based on landmark studies by Dragovic-Soso (2016); Subotić (2010), both of whom are exceptional in their discussion of reasons behind Bosnia’s failure to establish a truth commission. These authors find that multiple attempts to establish a truth commission failed for two main reasons. First, there was widespread resistance by conflict-era leaders to embrace social and political reconstruction (“Bosnian national leaderships expressed great willingness to support the TRC but only because they felt it was a good vehicle to tell their side of the story... [and] so they could kill it when it stopped serving their national interests”). Misplaced intentions, along with grievances such as inadequate inclusion in the discussion phase, in turn led domestic civil society organizations (including domestic victim associations) to unanimously reject the proposal for a truth commission. Second, institutional rivalry between the judicial International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the truth commission project caused the former to view the commission as a funding competitor, redundant exercise and a challenge to its primacy. Given that none of the reasons for the failure of truth commission setup (even by scholars that focused on the specific question) was any threat of return to conflict, and given that the ICTY was already pursuing questions of accountability in the context, it is very improbable that a truth commission would have caused a return to conflict.
6. **Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-1994) (post-civil war)** This case follows the same logic as the above. These are recorded as separate observations to indicate different non-state actors involved in the Bosnian War. From 1992-1995, the belligerents in question were Serbian irregulars. From 1993-1994, the belligerents were Croat irregulars.
7. **Myanmar (Burma): Arakan (1948-1994) (post-civil war)** In the two overlapping cases of civil war in Arakan and Kachin (Myanmar), there was no truth commission set up and while violence resumed in both cases, it was after the 10-year window that we are considering. Hence,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ , and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . A truth commission would have invited violent backlash from the military. We concluded this based on studies by Holliday (2014); Dukalskis (2015); Naing (June 15, 2012); International Center for Transitional Justice (2013). They find that the likelihood of establishing a truth commission was very low given that the military junta was not only at the forefront of large-

scale violence in these two civil wars, but also continues to be a powerful player despite the country’s 2011 transition (after which power was handed over to a retired Army general). As a result, there was a lack of discussion around or sustained enthusiasm for transitional justice mechanisms from domestic groups (both state and non-state) during the period of military rule. However, even after its transition, discussions around transitional justice have been met with well-documented fears of provoking backlash. For instance, in 2012, a group of state and civil society groups meeting in Chiang Mai to discuss Burmese transitions argued that “Burma is not yet ready to follow in South Africa’s footsteps by embarking on a path toward transitional justice... Such a move could even hinder the ongoing process of political reform in Burma” (Naing, June 15, 2012). Further, Holliday (2014) finds that a tangible accountability process is hindered because key institutions are still struggling to find their feet - the judiciary remains deeply deficient in the face of a culture of impunity and the army continues to be dominant. This leads him to argue that the place of transitional justice in Myanmar is likely to be “sporadic, fragile and contested” (197). Given this context, even though scholars such as Dukalskis (2015) have pitched truth commissions combined with existing amnesty as the least threatening option, transitional justice experts have expressed concern that pushing too hard on a transitional justice agenda could backfire. Patrick Pierce (head of the Myanmar program at the International Center for Transitional Justice) concludes that: “We can see nascent moves for transitional justice mechanisms as part of these reforms but no overall willingness or strategy to deal with the past ... there is a lot of ambivalence as well, and fear, that bringing up the past will provoke a coup by the military” (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2013).

8. **Myanmar (Burma): Kachin (1961-1992) (post-civil war)** This case follows the same logic as the overlapping civil war in Arakan, which is explained above.
9. **Thailand: CPT (1974-1982) (post-civil war)** Thailand experienced no truth commission at transition and the outcome was no resumption of conflict, i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . In this case, we believe that if Thailand had instituted a truth commission, it would have led to resumed conflict with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). We conclude this based on studies by Thomas (1986); Bergin (2016); Wedel (1982); Ettinger (2007), all of whom find that crucial components of (successful) counterinsurgency policy were offers of amnesty, opportunities to surrender, reparations and jobs to encourage transitions among members of the CPT. Further, Truth Commissions were not common at this time (the first completed truth commission was established in 1983), In a situation where the end of the conflict was predicated on opportunities for insurgents to move on from the past, the establishment of a truth commission to investigate the conflict would involve a reversal of state policy towards the CPT to investigate the past. This could, in turn, renew grievances among initially suspicious ex-insurgents and risk a return to conflict.
10. **Bangladesh - CHT (1975-1997) (post-civil war)** Bangladesh did not establish a truth commission in its peace accord that ended the conflict, and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict: ( $Y_i = 1, d_i = 0$ ), so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ , based on Feeny (2001); Mohsin (2003); UCDP (2018a) – the establishment of a truth commission could have rocked a fragile situation. Mohsin (2003) finds that because of the powerful position enjoyed by the Bangladeshi military, the peace accord included no measures for accountability even

though the conflict experienced massive human rights violations. Despite its limited nature, the peace accord was met with domestic resistance on both sides, tribal groups (who demanded full autonomy) and oppositional political parties (according to whom the accord contradicted the unitary constitution). Further, while the number of battle deaths has remained below 25 (hence the conflict is officially “terminated”), the Bangladeshi army has not withdrawn from the area and attacks have continued in relations between tribal groups. In light of continued tensions, state superiority and sustained military concentration, attempts at truth-telling (which could implicate the state) could lead to military backlash and a disruption of peace.

11. **Angola (1998-2002) (post-civil war)** There was no truth commission and the outcome was no resumption of conflict: ( $Y_i = 1, d_i = 0$ ), so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . In this case, we believe that if Angola had instituted a truth commission, conflict would have resumed. While it is challenging to make an imputation for cases that experienced no truth commission, our conclusion is based on our reading of interview-based analyses (such as International Center for Transitional Justice (2008); Skaar et al. (2015)) that record multiple stakeholders’ attitudes towards a potential truth commission. Across the spectrum of interviewees, these studies conclude that even though other countries in the region were experimenting with different forms of transitional justice, there was a conscious decision not to pursue a truth and reconciliation process in Angola. Instead, general amnesty was seen as the only viable option, given the duration, intensity, and complex nature of the conflict. The line between victims and perpetrators was blurred and virtually the entire country had in some way participated in or supported a war. Apart from complexities surrounding questions of who would testify were a commission to be established, expressions of war fatigue seemed overwhelming. According to International Center for Transitional Justice (2008), “the struggle of day-to-day existence leaves very little time for any other issues, including reconciliation. Moreover, concerns were raised that a TRC would taint the government’s record as liberators, compromising the ‘liberation discourse’ so cherished by government since the end of the war.” We conclude, then, that the establishment of a truth commission that neither the state nor the civilians seemed to want would have left post-war Angola in a worse position.
12. **Nicaragua (1982-1990) (post-civil war)** Nicaragua did not establish a truth commission upon its transition from civil war, and the outcome was no resumption of violence: ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ). As a result,  $Y_i(0) = 0$ , and we imputed  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . This implies that a transitional truth commission would have caused a resumption of conflict. We base this decision on two sources – first, an academic expert on the case speculated during an interview with the author, that any attempt at truth commission creation was undermined due to heavy US involvement with the rebel groups. This speculation is borne out by evidence in Stahler-Sholk (1994), who finds that peaceful reconstruction led by a progressive government was a near-impossibility in Nicaragua. The United States refused to demobilize the Contras and threatened to not lift its crippling trade embargo and financial blockade if the Sandinistas won. More generally, O’Shaughnessy and Dodson (1999) finds that the turning point of transition in Nicaragua was less clear (especially when compared to El Salvador). This is because the Contras were politically divided between their military and civilian leaders and the resulting pacts were weak in legitimacy and conducted in an atmosphere of potential de-legitimation of the entire process. In light of these concerns, we believe that the stakeholders were not yet committed to the basics of an electoral solution to Nicaragua and establishing a truth commission at a

time of divided loyalties would have made things worse.

13. **India - Nagaland (1992-1997) (post-civil war)** Nagaland did not establish a truth commission in 1997 and the outcome was a resumption of violence in 2000. As a result,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , so  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . Based on a reading of (UCDP, 2018g; Lacina, 2009; Kotwal, 2000; Baruah, 2003), we believe that a truth commission would not have been able to prevent a return to conflict. These studies reveal that the ceasefire of 1998 was incomplete because (a) it was signed with only one rebel faction (NSCN-IM), while the other (NSCN-K) continued cross-border attacks; (b) the language of the ceasefire was left intentionally vague, and the causes of conflict were left unaddressed; (c) it was only in 2000 that the state signed a separate ceasefire agreement with NSCN-K to prevent cross-border attacks. It was only after the second ceasefire agreement that security force fatalities reduced. Even so, subsequent negotiations have not been successful with either faction and a peace agreement with NSCN-IM was not signed until 2015. Given the conditions of negotiation, it is unlikely that a transitional truth commission (before ceasefires were signed with both rebel factions) would have had any impact on violence.
14. **United Kingdom - Northern Ireland (1971-1991) (post-civil war)** While violence in the conflict in Northern Ireland fell below conventional civil war standards in 1991, a comprehensive peace process was ongoing and conflicting parties remained in political deadlock till 1995 (UCDP, 2018f). No truth commission was established during this time, and the outcome was a spike in violence i.e.,  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . Given the difficulties in negotiation, the first ceasefire agreement was signed by the IRA in 1994 (and lasted only until 1996) and obstacles to any form of official truth seeking remained even after 1998's Good Friday Agreement (Connolly, 2006). In this context, the establishment of a truth commission was unlikely to have had a preventive effect on eventual conflict resumption.
15. **Angola (1975-1995) (post-civil war)** While the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accords in 1995 abated active fighting, no truth commission was established and the outcome was a resumption of conflict. In other words,  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ , and we imputed  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . A truth commission would have been unable to prevent a resumption of conflict. This is because the implementation of the Protocol proved to be difficult and low level fighting persisted. The lack of trust between parties remained, the rebel group UNITA failed to disarm properly and their lack of commitment to the peace process led to splits within the organization. As a result, the accord subsequently collapsed and heavy fighting erupted once more: in this setting, a truth commission would have made little difference to eventual conflict resumption.
16. **Liberia (1989-1990) (post-civil war)** Liberia did not set up a truth commission following a regional peacekeeping mission that abated violence, and the outcome was a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . Based on accounts of conflict progression, it is clear that the 1990 transition was fragile and incomplete. First, between 1990 and 1996, fourteen peace accords were negotiated but the country remained unstable (USIP, 2011d). Second, a conflict history makes clear that the resumption in civil conflict was 'in many ways a continuation of the first phase of conflict, but fought under new denominations' (UCDP, 2018e). Based on these considerations, it is unlikely that a transitional truth commission would have prevented factional conflict.



17. **India - Manipur (1982-1988) (post-civil war)** Manipur experienced a pause in civil conflict in 1988 but conflict resumed from 1993-96, 1998-2000 and 2003-09. Since there is a break of less than five years between these conflict cycles, we consider this a single case. With regards to the (temporary) conflict end in 1998,  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$  or  $Y_i(0) = 1$  and we imputed  $Y_i(1) = 1$ . With regards to conflict end in 2009, we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . Taken together, we believe that a truth commission would have had no effect, adverse or beneficial, on conflict outcomes. Based on a reading of conflict history, we find that these breaks in conflict were not transitions to peace; they were temporary reductions in casualties to below-civil war levels but fighting continued UCDP (2018*d*). In the meantime, the state pursued both, a violent counterinsurgency campaign with relative impunity, as well as peace and ceasefire agreements with different factions were signed, violated and revoked over the years (Chatterji and Kaur, 2016; Sinha, 2017). Given the fragility of the temporary violence reduction in 1988 (before any negotiations between parties), it is unlikely that a truth commission would have been established or been able to prevent conflict resumption. Post-2009 accounts from experts on and activists in the region however, have strongly emphasized the urgent need for transitional justice measures more generally and (Chatterji and Kaur, 2016) a truth commission more specifically (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2019; Nagaland Post, 2019). These analyses make it clear that an eventual truth commission would not have undermined the potential for sustained peace in the region.
18. **India - Assam (1983-1990) (post-civil war)** Assam experienced a return to conflict in 1994 after it did not establish a truth commission. Therefore,  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ , and we imputed  $Y_i(1) = 1$ . A truth commission was unlikely to make a contribution to peace (Baruah, 1994; Goswami, 2014; UCDP, 2018*c*). While the reduction in violence in 1990 was a result of much of the insurgent group (ULFA) surrendering arms in favor of amnesty and rehabilitation by the government, a hardline faction within ULFA refused to surrender and moved to other parts of South Asia to continue its struggle. As a result, by mid-1992 it was the campaign of violence had already resumed. Given this context of continuing factional rebellion in the context of dormant violence, a truth commission would have been unable to prevent violence resumption.

## B.5 Step 5: Unimputable Cases

1. **Iran (1946-1996) (post-civil war)** Iran experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
2. **Yemen (North Yemen) (1979-1982) (post-civil war)** North Yemen experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict for the next 10 years i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
3. **Lebanon (1958-1990) (post-civil war)** Lebanon experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.

4. **Laos (1959-1990) (post-civil war)** Laos experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
5. **Iraq (1961-1996) (post-civil war)** Laos experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
6. **Ethiopia (1976-1991) (post-civil war)** Ethiopia experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
7. **Indonesia - ELF (1965-1984) (post-civil war)** Indonesia experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict within the next 10 years i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
8. **Syria (1979-1982) (post-civil war)** Syria experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict within the next 10 years i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
9. **Guinea (2000-2001) (post-civil war)** Guinea experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
10. **Morocco (1975-1989) (post-civil war)** Morocco experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
11. **Mozambique (1977-1992) (post-civil war)** Mozambique experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
12. **Indonesia - Aceh (1999-2005) (post-civil war)** Indonesia experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
13. **Yemen (North Yemen) (1979-1982) (post-civil war)** North Yemen experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
14. **Pakistan (1990-1996) (post-civil war)** Pakistan experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.

15. **Congo (Brazzaville) (1993-2002) (post-civil war)** Congo experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
16. **Israel (2006-2006) (post-civil war)** Israel experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
17. **Iraq (1982-1996) (post-civil war)** Iraq experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
18. **Ethiopia (1976-1983) (post-civil war)** Ethiopia experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
19. **Indonesia - Aceh (1990-1991) (post-civil war)** Indonesia experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
20. **Rwanda (1990-2002) (post-civil war)** Rwanda experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
21. **Senegal (1988-2003) (post-civil war)** Senegal experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
22. **Georgia (1992-1993)(post-civil war)** Georgia experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
23. **Tajikistan (1992-1999) (post-civil war)** Tajikistan experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
24. **Israel (1990-1999) (post-civil war)** Israel experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been a resumption of conflict i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.

## C Democratization Imputations

### C.1 Step 1: Disbanded and Discredited Cases

1. **Bolivia (1967-1982) (post-authoritarian)** The outcome in this case was a continuation of democratic functioning following a disbanded truth commission (National Commission for Investigation for Forced Disappearances), i.e. ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . In this case, we believe that even if Bolivia had completed its truth commission process, the state would be unlikely to experience a return to authoritarianism. Our conclusion is based on studies such as Hayner (2000); Skaar (1999); USIP (2011*b*), which found that the 1982 truth commission was able to document 155 cases of disappearance, even though none of the cases were conclusively investigated and the commission’s mandate prevented investigations into incidents of torture, illegal detention and other abuses of note. Two years into its functioning, the commission disbanded without producing a final report, owing to a lack of sufficient resources and political support to complete its work. In the mid-1980s, numerous civil society debates surrounding the work of the commission led political figures to set aside the initial amnesty law (from the time of transition) that protected the outgoing military regime from prosecution and institute the trials against more than 50 former officials of the military government. These trials were not based on evidence gained by the Truth Commission, but “the combination of a truth commission, trials, and private efforts at truth-finding resulted in what Human Rights Watch and others characterized as an overall positive process” (Hayner, 2000, p. 54). Given that the commission was disbanded because of (a) a lack of sufficient resources or support and (b) an establishment of other transitional justice mechanisms that did not lead to any backlash from the outgoing regime, it is unlikely that a completed truth commission would have catalyzed a return to military dictatorship.
2. **Philippines (post-authoritarian)** The outcome was no return to authoritarianism, therefore ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . In this case, we believe that if the Philippines had instituted a truth commission, authoritarianism would not have resumed. We conclude this based on our reading of Hayner (1994), Dancy et al. (2010) and Avruch and Vejarano (2001). They find that a truth commission was set up but was disbanded before completing its work out of financial constraints, a lack of cooperation from political leaders, the cutting short of committee work on account of death of leadership and reports of continuing violence against civilians. According to them “justice may be served if human rights abuses are systematically documented through nonofficial mechanisms” (Avruch and Vejarano, 2001),’ suggesting that an investigation itself would not have invited authoritarian backlash.

### C.2 Step 2: Treated Cases

1. **Argentina (1977-1983) (post-authoritarian)** Upon democratization, Argentinian President Alfonsin established a truth commission (the National Commission on Disappearances or CONADEP) and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism. Therefore, ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), so  $Y_i(1) = 0$  and we imputed that  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . Authoritarianism would not have resumed even if Argentina would not have established a truth commission at transition. Based on our reading of Brysk (1994); Crenzel (2012); Sikkink (2008); Americas Watch

(1991); the truth commission made significant contributions to accountability and inspired rapid growth in the number of truth commissions worldwide, but it was also met with controversy domestically. Specifically, CONADEP’s report *Nunca Más*, a powerful indictment of the repressive policies of the machinery of state terror, has remained a domestic and international bestseller. It collected wide-ranging evidence on the targets of the military regime and brought hundreds of cases against repressors implicated in testimonies. At the same time, CONADEP’s setup inspired opposition and boycott from prominent human rights organizations at multiple points out of disagreements on the structure of the commission, treatment of information around disappeared individuals, and allegations of sensationalism. Further, the televised broadcasting of the report was immediately followed by acts of violence against the television station and acts of military insubordination, both of which were perceived as threats to peace related to the commission’s activities. The significant contributions of this initial attempt at truth commissions on one hand, combined with reactions by the human rights community and the military on the other, lead us to believe that authoritarianism would have been unlikely to resume even in the absence of a truth commission.

2. **Chad (1982-1990) (post-authoritarian)** Chad established a truth commission at democratization and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$  i.e., the truth commission did not have a causal impact on democratization. Our conclusion is based on case-specific and comparative analyses by Hayner (2000); Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2009b); Reed Brody (2005); USIP (2011c); Bakiner (2015). These authors call the Chadian truth commission a “highly partial” tool to discredit the old regime and legitimize the new one for a number of reasons. First, the truth commission was severely handicapped by a lack of resources: due to a shortage of space, the commission was forced to set up its headquarters in the former secret detention center of the security forces, thus deterring many former victims from giving testimony. Further, due to the seizure of extremely limited transportation available to the commission by combatants, the commission was unable to send investigators to the interior of the country. Finally, despite its relatively restricted mandate and operational difficulties, the truth commission was able to publish a detailed report with proof of foreign government involvement in the funding of the worst violators, and its findings remained relevant even a decade later during Habré’s international trial. However, no material reparations were provided and any recommendations made in the commission’s report have largely been ignored. More than 40 leaders from the Habré-era still occupy official positions, no ex-accomplices have been published, and no monument honoring the memory of the victims was constructed. In light of the obstacles the commission faced at the time of setup, functioning and implementation, the absence of a truth commission would not have led to a return of authoritarianism.
3. **Chile (post-authoritarian)** Chile established a truth commission at transition and the outcome has been sustained democratization without a return to authoritarianism, hence ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), and  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . Based on our reading of case specific and comparative transitional justice scholars, we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ . The absence of a truth commission would not have caused Chile to return to authoritarianism, due to its divergent short and long-term legacies. In terms of legacy, the Chilean truth commission was seen as a creative endeavor in providing acknowledgement, memorials, reparations, and apologies (Ensalaco, 1994; Brahm, 2005). Such observations have led authors such as Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010)

to conclude that in the long term, the truth commission had a ‘positive, though indirect impact on democratization’ by providing evidence for trials. In the short term, however, the military rejected the commission’s findings, and its release was immediately followed up by episodes of political violence (Amstutz, 2005; Quinn, 2001). Amstutz (2005) argues that while the commission’s revelations and Aylwin’s acknowledgment helped restore public trust and renew democratic political culture, the message appeared to only reach moderates while conservatives remained lukewarm at best. The positive long-term effects combined with short-term complications and violence given the significant power still enjoyed by Pinochet’s supporters, make it unlikely that Chile would return to authoritarianism in the absence of a truth commission.

4. **Guatemala (1986-1995) (post-authoritarian)** The outcome was no resumption of authoritarianism, i.e. ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ . In this case, we believe that even if Guatemala had not instituted a truth commission, the state would not have returned to authoritarianism. This imputation is based on our reading of case-specific analysis by (Grandin, 2005; Rachel et al., 2013; Corntassel and Holder, 2008; Isaacs, 2010; Ross, 2004; Rothenberg, 2016). These analyses of the commission lead them to conclude that although the Guatemalan truth commission was effective in establishing a baseline for descriptive and forensic truth, domestic politics caused polarization and interfered with the commission’s efforts to produce reconciliation. Specifically, owing to a constricted political environment after a cosmetic and military-led democratic transition, the investigation was intentionally vague and prohibited publishing the names of perpetrators. The commission failed to represent those most affected by violence. The governing elite was unwilling to support the Commission’s findings and explicitly rejected the resulting report’s policy recommendations. As a result, the popular reaction to the truth commission’s findings (especially its suggestion that the violence in question was genocidal) was highly polarizing in an already divided society, and the findings were unable to impact Guatemalan governance or the way in which powerful groups remembered the past. According to a 2006 survey by Isaacs (2010), “only 14 percent of respondents described Guatemala as reconciled, while close to half (44 percent) believed another war is possible” (270). Although authoritarianism has not resumed, violent attacks on human rights defenders and individuals demanding accountability have persisted, indicating that accountability continues to be fraught with disruptions of peace.
  
5. **Nepal (1952-1991) (post-authoritarian)** Upon democratization, the commission (‘Commission on Inquiry to Find the Disappeared Persons during the Panchayat Period’) was established and the outcome was democratization for the next 12 years i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ) and  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$  based on studies by Olsen et al. (2010); Thapa (1992); Barkan and Karn (2006); Hayner (2000). We conclude that the truth commission did not contribute significantly to sustained democratization. According to these authors, Nepal possesses many characteristics such as awareness and demand for accountability, civil society pressure for human rights, that are conducive to improvements in human rights. At the same time, the truth commission that did get established was judged to be too weak to bring stability and accountability. Because of its narrow mandate to investigate limited cases (of which it was only able to get to a fraction), inability to name perpetrators, lack of subpoena power and failure to implement recommendations; experts said that the commission “succeeded in appeasing potential human rights violators” (Olsen et al., 2010, p. 471) and was merely “a

political exercise” (Barkan and Karn, 2006, p. 41). Consequently, it is unlikely that Nepal would have returned to authoritarianism in the absence of a truth commission.

6. **Nigeria (1994-1999) (post-authoritarian)** The outcome was no return to an authoritarian apartheid regime, which implies that  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ . In this case, we believe that even if Nigeria would not have instituted a truth commission at the time of democratic transition, authoritarianism would not have resumed. We conclude this based on studies by Nwogu (2007) and Yusuf (2007). They interviewed local participants and experts on the commission and found that the truth commission process in the country failed because of deep political capture and resource constraints. According to these studies, the truth commission received subsidies from the international community, but it lacked the budget, patience and sincerity to create context-specific procedures. Additionally, civilians perceived the source of the HRVIC itself seemed antithetical to truth commission goals, because it was set up by a former military leader who was still engaged. Although Osbanjo perceived of the HRVIC as a means to distance himself from his predecessors, he was not vested in the moral claims of pronouncing against the past and allegedly engaged in deliberate financial strangulation to undermine the working of the Commission. These deep issues, germane to commission establishment, lead us to believe that the truth commission had no causal effect in preventing a return to authoritarianism.
7. **Sri Lanka (1979-1994) (post-authoritarian)** Within the first year of democratization, the Sri Lankan President established three linked commissions (‘Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons’) to investigate abuses that occurred in different regions of the country from 1988 to 1994. The outcome has been a continuation of democratic functioning without a return to authoritarianism, so  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$  or  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . Based on our reading of authors (such as Barkan and Karn (2006); Neistat (2008); Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010)) who discuss the impact of the truth commission, we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ . We believe that even if Sri Lanka had not initiated these commissions at democratization, it would likely not have catalyzed a resumption of authoritarianism. Even though the commissions analyzed tens of thousands of complaints, uncovered evidence of systematic state-sponsored violence, and criminal proceedings were instituted against members of the security forces; it was considered merely perfunctory. This because only a handful of these cases went to trial and there was little attempt to go beyond recitations of bare facts instead of examining moral underpinnings of crimes committed and being precise about affixing blame. While it provided for some reparations, the influence of the final report and the ability of the state to implement its measures was minimized by the continued persistence of civil conflict against the Tamil Tigers. In this context, “existential threats [took] priority over the perceived luxuries of democracy and human rights. . . it is difficult to justify exploring past human rights violations when abuses remain ongoing and . . . ending the fighting is top priority” (Barkan and Karn, 2006, p. 149-150). Due to an undermining of the truth commission from continued fighting and politicization after democratization, we believe that the truth commission did not have a lone causal effect in preventing authoritarianism.
8. **South Africa (post-authoritarian)** South Africa established a truth commission at transition and the outcome was no return to an authoritarian apartheid regime, hence  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 1$ . In this case, we believe that if South Africa

had not instituted a truth commission at the time of democratic transition, it would have returned to the old order. Our conclusion is based (among others) on landmark studies by Gibson (2006, 2004, 2002) that rely on extensive interviews to deem the truth commission and its innovative institutional arrangements as key to South Africa’s transition. The TRC was viewed on average as having a moderately positive effect across sociodemographic variables (Stein et al., 2008). These studies find that claims of South Africans being dissatisfied with their commission were largely limited to White South Africans, but more than 85 percent of Black South Africans interviewed believed that “the commission did a reasonable job of letting families know what happened to their loved ones, of providing a true and unbiased account of the country’s history, and of ensuring that human rights abuses would not happen again” (Gibson, 2002). Even though the government’s failure to institute timely and adequate reparations to victims immediately following the Truth Commission created renewed political tensions (Laplante and Theidon, 2007), the investigation into and reparations for violations likely prevented their repetition. In fact, Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) adds undeniable confidence to our imputation by engaging in an explicit counterfactual analysis around the South African commission’s contribution to South African democracy. Specifically, he writes that “a brief counterfactual suggests that the TRC did play a significant role in this regard [contribution to democratic institutions]. Imagine a South Africa in which the TRC did not exist. Perhaps the NP was able to extract a blanket amnesty as a concession for giving up power. Vigilantism would likely have exploded and whites would have fled South Africa in even larger numbers. Conversely, a South Africa in which many apartheid government officials were put on trial would seem a likely recipe for civil war. Many observers believed whites would prefer civil war to being ruled by the ANC. As it turned out, the TRC did just enough to satisfy all sides” (48).

9. **Haiti (1991-1994) (post-authoritarian)** The Haitian truth commission (Commission Nationale de Vérité et de Justice) was set up upon transition from military rule in 1994. The outcome has been a resumption of authoritarianism in 2000, hence ( $Y_i = 1, d_i = 1$ ) and  $Y_i(1) = 1$ . Based on our reading of the commission from Chapman and Ball (2001); Quinn (2009); McCalpin (2012); Benedetti (1996), we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 1$ . The truth commission did not contribute to a return to authoritarianism. Case-specific studies discuss various reasons why the work of the commission was undermined. These reasons included a lack of popular support, absent political will, lack of institutional capacity, shortages of resources, constraints resulting from US censorship of the intervention, and public inaccessibility. At the same time, none of these studies find that the commission itself became too politically sensitive, caused backlash among political elite or compromised nascent democracy. Instead, Freedom House finds that such changes in regime are frequent in Haiti regardless of truth commission establishment: “over the past two centuries, there have been 34 coups d’état in Haiti, and the violent overthrow of government has been far more commonplace than the peaceful transition of power from one president to another” (Freedom House, 2010). It is unlikely that a relatively weak truth commission, established in a context of an unstable regime, triggered a return to authoritarianism.

### C.3 Step 3: Non-Transitional Cases

1. **Brazil (1965-1985) (post-authoritarian)** In Brazil, there was no truth commission at



transition and the outcome was no resumption of authoritarianism – ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ , and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . The first step in Brazil’s transition to democracy was the establishment of an amnesty law that provided immunity for human rights abuses committed by both, the military and the resistance. This amnesty was deemed “essential to make way for a secure transition” by allowing for the return of political prisoners (Schallennmueller, 2014). While the law prevented successive governments from confronting the military directly through an official commission (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2009a), it has paradoxically reinvigorated attempts at unofficial investigation that has proved to be the basis of governmental action (Bickford, 2007). Specifically, civil society lawyers gained access to archives of every case brought before military courts, which they used to write a 2,700-page investigative report (‘Brasil: Nunca Mais’) that became an instant best-seller and established military complicity in human rights abuses during authoritarian rule. In response, the Brazilian government proceeded to remove or block individuals named as torturers in this project from public office and began a reparations program for the families of the 135 disappeared. Bakiner (2015) deems this an example of how non-official investigations can substitute for the lack of political initiative in addressing the public demand for the truth concerning human rights violations. While the list of cases in this report is far from comprehensive, according to Bickford (2007), this effort is “best understood as a replacement for a truth commission, since an official truth commission was unlikely at that time”. Given that an unofficial initiative mirroring the work of a truth commission soon after democratic transition did not lead to military backlash from a still-relevant military, it is unlikely that an official effort to investigate such abuse would have revived authoritarianism. In 2011, in an effort to comply with the IAHCRC, Brazil established a truth commission to clarify the history of violations until 1988 (Schallennmueller, 2014), but this commission is a non-transitional one.

2. **Ghana (1982-1993) (post-authoritarian)** Ghana experienced no transitional truth commission (though a non-transitional one was established in 2002) and the outcome was no resumption of authoritarianism. In other words, ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . If Ghana had established a truth commission at transition, it would not have returned to authoritarianism. We conclude this based on studies of the conditions of transition and the establishment of the eventual non-transitional truth commission in Ghana. First, Alidu and Ame (2013) shows that the Ghanaian transition, unlike others, already had strong state institutions and vibrant civil society organizations in place. Apart from instituting free and fair elections, Ghana also had a hierarchical court structure, a vibrant parliament, active civil society organizations, horizontal institutions of accountability (such as the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice and the National Commission for Civic Education). Further, Ameh (2006) argues that despite the (non-transitional) commission’s difficulties in offering an authoritative account of the truth, it was ultimately successful because the specific yet flexible mandate of the NRC, the high standard of proof adopted, the elaborate information management process, and the internal control mechanisms put in place favorably positioned the NRC to ascertain truth regarding the cases it deliberated. Union (2013) documents that public hearings garnered massive attention from the media, victims turned out in large numbers to make statements and testify and had a generally positive view of the commission’s work. These analyses lead us to conclude that even if a truth commission would have been established at the time of transition, it would not have contributed to a

return of authoritarianism.

3. **Korea (South) (1962-1987) (post-authoritarian)** Over a decade after its transition, South Korea set up a truth commission in 2000 to investigate incidents of human rights abuse, violence and massacres occurring over the course of a century, since the period of Japanese colonialism to the nation's anti-communist dictatorships before democratization. After this commission completed its work, the Parliament followed up by establishing another, broader truth commission to examine these periods. As a result,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$  and we imputed  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . Based on analyses by Suh (2010); USIP (2011*i,j*); Gentilucci (2005); Han (2005), we conclude that a truth commission at transition would not have risked a return to authoritarianism. The demand for investigating past incidents has been widespread in South Korea, leading national police and state information agencies to establish internal units in order to investigate past human rights violations and suspicious deaths starting as early as 1988 and to try former leaders in the early 1990s. While critiquing these trials for their political showmanship instead of providing closure or justice, Gentilucci (2005) argues that the South Korean trial demonstrates that for post-conflict trials to be successful, it is imperative that they be accompanied by a comprehensive truth-finding function. Official state responses to demands for truth-telling (though completed with varying degrees of success) give us reason to believe that a transitional truth commission would not have undermined democratic functioning.
4. **Paraguay (1955-1993) (post-authoritarian)** Panama established a (non-transitional) truth commission in 2004, over a decade after its transition to democracy, and the outcome has been a continuation of democratic functioning. Hence,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$  and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . A truth commission at transition would not have caused a resumption of authoritarianism. We impute this based on studies by Hayner (2010); Backer (2003); Cohen (1995); Collins (2012); USIP (2011*f*). They find that: (a) even though political infighting overshadowed the need to officially address the abuses of the past, two unofficial (non-state sponsored) attempts at uncovering disappearances during the Strossner regime were successfully undertaken immediately following the transition and (b) once the non-transitional commission was undertaken, it did not spark opposition backlash. In the context of continued legal and civil society efforts at transition to discover authoritarian-era abuses without negative outcomes for democracy, we believe that a transitional truth commission would not have led to a resumption of authoritarianism.
5. **Panama (1983-1989) (post-authoritarian)** Panama established a (non-transitional) truth commission in 2001, over a decade after its transition to democracy, and the outcome has been a continuation of democratic functioning. Hence,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$  and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ , implying that the establishment of the truth commission at the time of transition would have led to authoritarian backlash. We conclude this based on studies by Ranft (2011); Mendez and Mariezcurrena (2003); New York Times (2001); Bakiner (2015); USIP (2011*e*) – who find that two main factors prevented the establishment of a truth commission at transition. First, the balance of power at transition was tilted in favor of military-loyal elite. The ex-military's aide won the nation's first free and fair general elections since 1960 and took over its leadership, despite the opposition's attempts to emphasize the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) candidate's collaboration with the authoritarian

regime. Second, Panamanian activists alleged that given America’s involvement in and invasion of Panama in 1989, Washington had no interest in promoting investigations that could reveal American ties to the military leader or uncover details about civilian deaths. Consequently, any attempt at investigation was curbed as a result of both domestic and external pressures. It was only in 2000, when the pre-regime president’s widow Mireya Moscoso took office (even though the parliamentary assembly was controlled by the PRD), that the distribution of power changed and civil society organizations began exhumations at a former military base. The finding of several corpses led to the official order for exhumations and a decree to establish the truth commission in 2001. Even once it was established, however, the commission faced serious setbacks from a lack of funds and opposition from the PRD-controlled national assembly. The party not only slashed its funding, but also threatened to seek legal action against the president for its creation. Given the pressures at transition and their persistence in light of still-strong elite from the previous regime, it is likely that a transitional truth commission would have caused greater backlash from the ex-military’s aides.

6. **Uruguay (1974-1984) (post-authoritarian)** In Uruguay, no truth commission was established at transition and the outcome was no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . In this case, we believe that if Uruguay had instituted a truth commission, it would have made things worse and would have caused a return to authoritarianism once again. Nearly two decades after transition, a state-led truth commission was established to investigate the period of authoritarian rule, (Allier, 2006) but this was not a transitional truth commission and hence this case remains untreated. Our imputation is based on case-specific studies that show the myriad of post-authoritarian challenges the country faced. First, the military agreed to a transition only after a secret pact in which major political leaders pledged not to open investigations human rights violations. Instead, the military specifically threatened to demobilize democracy if accountability was made part of the state agenda (Méndez, 1997; Roniger, 2011). Second, in the face of pressure from international, civil society and human rights organizations, a popular referendum against annulling impunity-imparting ‘Law of Expiry of the Punitive Powers of the State’ was brought to vote in 1989. However, the Uruguayan leader Sanguinetti openly campaigned to retain the law on the basis of the inevitability of a coup d’état if it was repealed, effectively calling on Uruguayans to choose between justice and democracy (Méndez, 1997). Given this dilemma, the results of the referendum (with a turnout of 85 percent) upheld the Law of Expiry by a margin of over 13 points (Roniger, 2011). While civil society efforts culminated in the publishing of the SERPAJ report in 1989 (Uruguay: Nunca Más), the government made no response to it (Bickford, 2007). In a situation where democracy and accountability were presented as a tradeoff, an official truth commission would have witnessed low participation due to high levels of fear and potentially invited punitive, democracy-threatening action from the military.
7. **Thailand (2007-2007) (post-authoritarian)** Thailand established a non-transitional truth commission (Bakiner, 2015) and is hence considered untreated. The outcome was a resumption of authoritarianism via a coup in 2014, so ( $Y_i = 1, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . We believe, based on studies such as Human Rights Watch (2012); Pongsudhirak (2003); Baker (2016), that authoritarianism would have resumed regardless of the truth commission. This is because authoritarianism and impunity for politically motivated

violence have deep roots in Thailand. Regime instability and alternations between democracy and authoritarianism have persisted since 1977, even in the absence of truth commissions. Further, even once it was established, the truth commission received insufficient support from the government because of which it was unable to complete its work. Participants in the proceedings also reported high degrees of mistrust and lack of cooperation. In light of these considerations, it is highly unlikely that this ineffective truth commission in an unstable regime catalyzed the resumption of authoritarianism in Thailand.

#### C.4 Step 4: Untreated Cases

1. **El Salvador (1982-1994) (post-authoritarian)** El Salvador did not establish a truth commission and it did not experience a return to authoritarianism. Hence,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , so  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that a truth commission would not have made post-authoritarian outcomes worse based on a study by Stahler-Sholk (1994) and O’Shaughnessy and Dodson (1999). These studies show that even though voter turnout remained low, the 1994 election was conducted largely without manipulation and the potential for the return to authoritarianism was very low. The military was no longer dominant in the political scene, polarization was relatively low, and the state had already established a truth commission to investigate the FMLN conflict (discussed above) that served to bring the military’s actions under the scanner despite its weaknesses. Consequently, another attempt at the truth commission would have been unlikely to undermine seemingly stable democratic functioning.
2. **Haiti (2000-2004) (post-authoritarian)** Upon its transition from the 2004 coup d’etat, Haiti did not establish a truth commission, and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism. Hence,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed, based on our reading of Haiti’s experience with a truth commission in 1994 Chapman and Ball (2001); Quinn (2009); McCalpin (2012); Benedetti (1996) and our reading of post-coup domestic politics (United Nations Peacekeeping, N.d.; Leininger, 2006; Billon, 2012), that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ . A truth commission would have had no impact on Haiti’s chances of continued democratization. This is because, first, Haiti’s first attempt at a truth commission was undermined due to a lack of political support and political will, and thus was unable to pull the country out of its vicious circle of authoritarian resumption. Second, Haiti remained a “failing state” even at its transition in 2004, given its inability to provide physical and human security to its citizens due to a lack of resources and functioning state institutions, making it unlikely that a renewed attempt at a truth commission would have been any more successful. Finally, following the instability resulting from the 2004 coup, the United Nations established a Stabilisation Mission in Haiti to “restore a secure and stable environment” that continued its operations in 2017. It is likely that the observed lack of authoritarian resumption in the region is a result of the international dynamics and presence (though often controversial) of the peacekeeping intervention, and that a potential truth commission would have had little independent contribution in this context.
3. **Liberia (1998-2003) (post-authoritarian)** We consider this case untreated because even though a truth commission was established in 2003, the mandate was the investigation of the period of internal conflict (and not exclusively under the Taylor regime). However, since the end of conflict in Liberia coincided with its democratization and the resulting truth

commission included this period within its mandate, this case follows very similar logic to that of Liberia (2000-2003), discussed above. Specifically, there was no truth commission exclusive to the Taylor regime, but even if such a truth commission had been established, it would not have undermined democratic functioning. In other words,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$  and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$  as well.

4. **Mexico (1916-2000) (post-authoritarian)** Upon its transition to democracy after over 70 years of single-party rule, Mexico did not set up a truth commission and the outcome was sustained democratic functioning. In other words,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$  and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$  based on a study by Bickford (2005). Specifically, he finds that even though an official truth commission was not established, the transitional government was committed to investigating human rights abuses, crimes and excesses of the past. Consequently, the government decided to establish a Special Prosecutor’s Office in 2001 as a carefully considered alternative to a truth commission because “it offered a potentially innovative combination of accountability for past human rights abuses through criminal law on the one hand, and of truth-seeking about the past on the other” [p.543]. In addition to this body, the National Human Rights Commission released a report on disappearances from the 1970s to early 1980s that was considered analogous to a truth commission report. Finally, in 2002, the classified files of intelligence services that cover intelligence services’ activities during the 1970s and 1980s were made available to the broader public via transfer to General National Archives. While these initiatives were met with varying degrees of success and skepticism, the fact that multiple official and enhanced truth-seeking initiatives were established upon transition makes it clear that a truth commission would have posed no risk to Mexico’s democracy.
5. **Nepal (2003-2006) (post-authoritarian)** In 2002, parliament was dissolved, and the king dismissed the prime minister. He in turn imposed “direct rule,” restricted press freedom, and imprisoned hundreds, claiming that the country needed peace and security before it could have democracy (Bohara et al., 2006). By 2006, however, massive demonstrations forced the king to reinstate the previously elected parliament, which in turn stripped the king of virtually all power in June 2006. Following this transition, no truth commission was set up and the outcome was no resumption of authoritarianism,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$  or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . The case follows a similar political logic to Nepal – CPN-M (1966-2006), discussed above. We imputed that a truth commission would not have undermined peace or democratic functioning i.e.,  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ .
6. **Peru - Fujimori (1993-2000) (post-authoritarian)** The establishment of the truth commission coincided with the end of the Fujimori regime. Even though the transition from authoritarianism provided a political opening for accountability (Bakiner, 2015), the commission’s mandate was primarily set up to investigate the civil war. As a result, this observation is considered untreated. At the same time, Fujimori’s civilian dictatorship was covered within its mandate (USIP, 2011*g*) and hence the case follows a logic similar to that of ‘Peru - Shining Path (1982-1999)’, discussed above. Specifically, a truth commission specific to the authoritarian period would not have contributed to a resumption of authoritarianism. In other words,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , so  $Y_i(1) = 0$  and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ .
7. **Serbia (1992-2000) (post-authoritarian)** The Milošević regime was overthrown in October 2000, following the results of a Presidential election and a long-running pro-democracy

movement. While a truth commission in Serbia was established by the incoming President, its mandate was to investigate war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo) in the past two decades (USIP, 2011*h*) and not Milošević’s term per se. As a result, this case is untreated and the outcome has been sustained democratic functioning:  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 0$ , implying that a truth commission to investigate the authoritarian regime would not have caused its resumption. We conclude this based on studies by Ostojić (2013); McDonald (2004); Kandic (2005); Gow and Zveržhanovski (2004). The idea of such a truth commission originated from civil society even before Milošević was ousted from power. Post-transition, the domestic government saw truth commission creation as a way to demonstrate their willingness to deal with a war crimes legacy. However, given the nature of crimes committed, the international community did not consider the commission a replacement for the UN-sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). Instead, cooperation with the ICTY constituted a precondition for Serbia’s access to international financial assistance. Consequently, Milošević was arrested by the Yugoslav police in 2001 and extradited to the ICTY’s jurisdiction in the Hague soon after. Milošević died mid-trial and the international community believed that the ICTY had failed to generate any reckoning with the past or any normative change in the targeted states. The clear primacy of the ICTY in the Milošević case indicates that a completed parallel attempt at the domestic level would have reinforced or complimented the work of the ICTY, but it would not have had an impact on the return to authoritarianism.

8. **Sierra Leone (1997-1998) (post-authoritarian)** Sierra Leone did not establish a truth commission at transition and the outcome was no resumption of authoritarianism. In other words,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 0$ . We believe that a truth commission (even if established to cover the authoritarian period specifically), would have had no impact on the eventual regime outcome. This case follows a logic similar to Sierra Leone (1991-2001), since the time period of this period of authoritarianism was covered under the mandate of the truth commission. At the same time, the truth commission was established to cover the conflict, so this case is considered untreated.
9. **Honduras (1973-1981) (post-authoritarian)** Honduras did not set up a truth commission upon its transition from military rule, and the outcome has been sustained democratic functioning. As a result,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . A truth commission would have caused a return to authoritarianism. This is because, as Kaye (1997) finds, Honduras remained relatively free of human rights violations during the military governments of the 1970s, but the situation deteriorated following the return to civilian government in 1981 when the US dramatically strengthened the power of the military vis-à-vis the civilian government. As a result, forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and human rights violations increased until 1993, when the fair and free election of Carlos Roberto Reina (noted human rights defender) reaffirmed the stability of democratic processes in Honduras. In 1993, an official investigation into the violations from 1980-1993 undertaken by the National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights, Leo Valladares Lanza) revealed that members of the Honduran military and Nicaraguan insurgents operating in Honduras were responsible for the disappearances, and Argentine and U.S. intelligence units were instrumental in their training (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Given the continuation of external support to military and abuses of human rights even after the formal end of the

military regime, it is likely that the establishment of a truth commission would have caused an authoritarian backlash.

10. **Nicaragua (1980-1990) (post-authoritarian)** Since democratization followed the end of the civil war, this case follows the same logic as Nicaragua (1982-1990) (post-civil war), as discussed above. We imputed that the establishment of a truth commission could have led to a revival of tensions, or  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ .
11. **Burundi (1988-1993) (post-authoritarian)** After its first transition from authoritarianism, Burundi did not lay out plans for a truth commission. The outcome was a resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$ , so  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We imputed  $Y_i(1) = 1$  based on our reading of the history of the case (Falch, 2008; Falch and Becker, 2008; Amnesty International, 2015; UCDP, 2018*h*). It is clear that even though this period was not authoritarian, official attempts at power sharing (such as the Convention of Government, 1994) failed and clashes between rebel groups continued, eventually leading to the assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected President. A separate commission of inquiry was set up to investigate this incident in 1995 (USIP, 2011*a*; Dancy et al., 2010) and the military coup of 1996. The transitional situation was characterized by continuing tensions and another seizure of power, making it unlikely that a truth commission would have been able to prevent a return to authoritarianism.
12. **Burundi (1997-2003) (post-authoritarian)** While plans for a truth commission were in order by the time the power sharing agreement that effectively ended authoritarianism was signed, the truth commission mandate was not specific to the Buyoya regime and hence this case is considered untreated. The outcome has been no formal resumption of authoritarianism, so  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ , and we imputed  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . Because of the fragile state of democratization, a truth commission would have risked a return to authoritarianism. It is clear through a reading of domestic politics in the country (Falch, 2008; Arieff, 2015; Falch and Becker, 2008; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2018; USIP, 2011*a*) that both, conflictual and authoritarian tendencies persisted in the country despite formal power sharing agreements. On the conflict end, the FLN disarmed in 2008 but has been linked to many domestic attacks since 2010. On the regime side, the trend has been towards democratic backsliding. Pierre Nkurunziza, who was elected as President in 2005 shortly after democratic transition, was in 2015 allowed a disputed third term in office even though he was responsible for a coup attempt, severe repression, shutdown of independent media, and the exodus of hundreds of thousands from the country (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2018; Mechkova et al., 2017). Given these difficulties, political elite preferred a cessation of hostilities and the return of political stability (Vandeginste, 2012) over transitional justice attempts that inevitably carried the risk of derailing the fragile transition toward peace, security and stability. Civilians preferred to forgive and forget than to seek the truth by investigating the past (Samii, 2013). Given the dual dilemmas of continuing conflict and democratic backsliding, a truth commission attempt would likely have made the fragile situation worse.
13. **Central African Republic (1982-1993) (post-authoritarian)** Central African Republic did not establish a truth commission, and the outcome has been a resumption of authoritarianism  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(1) = 0$  and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 1$ . A truth commission would not have been able to prevent a return to authoritarianism. A reading of CAR's history

suggests that the country had a long history of both, civil conflict and regime switching. The establishment of a truth commission at transition in the face of continuing tensions would not have been able to break the country’s cycle of returns to authoritarianism. CAR only considered transitional justice alternatives starting 2003, after tensions that characterized past transitions had somewhat subsided.

14. **Sierra Leone (1992-1996) (post-authoritarian)** Sierra Leone did not establish a truth commission after the military handed over power to a democratically elected government. The outcome was a return to authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(1) = 0$  and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(0) = 1$ . A truth commission would not have been able to prevent the return to authoritarianism. Given that the transition to elected governance (a) occurred at the time of ongoing civil war and (b) lasted less than a year before being ousted by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in 1997, there was little time or scope for the establishment of a truth commission. Even if such a truth commission were established, it wouldn’t have been able to complete its work in the context of continuing violence or prevent the observed authoritarian outcome given the continued dominance of the military.
15. **Thailand (1977-1988) (post-authoritarian)** After its transition from authoritarianism in 1988, Thailand did not establish a truth commission, and the outcome was a resumption of authoritarianism in 1992. As a result,  $(Y_i = 1, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$  and we imputed that  $\tilde{Y}_i(1) = 1$ . This imputation follows a logic similar to the authoritarian transition in Thailand (2007) (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Pongsudhirak, 2003; Baker, 2016) discussed above. Regime instability (alternations between democracy and authoritarianism) have been frequent in Thailand, leading scholars to characterize Thailand as a ‘semi-democracy’ (Neher, 1996). Secondly, a truth commission attempt in 2010 also failed to prevent the coup in 2014. It is unlikely, then, that a truth commission following the fragile transition in 1988 would have been effective in preventing a return to authoritarianism.
16. **Thailand (1992-1992) (post-authoritarian)** This case follows the same logic as the authoritarian transition in Thailand in 1988, explained above.

## C.5 Step 5: Unimputable Cases

1. **Albania (1945-1991) (post-authoritarian)** Albania experienced no truth commission at transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
2. **Azerbaijan (1992-1992) (post-authoritarian)** Azerbaijan experienced no truth commission at transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
3. **Bangladesh (2008-2008) (post-authoritarian)** Bangladesh experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.



4. **Benin (1973-1990) (post-authoritarian)** Benin experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
5. **Bulgaria (1945-1990) (post-authoritarian)** Bulgaria experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
6. **Congo (Brazzaville) (1969-1991) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
7. **Czechoslovakia (1949-1989) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established in Czechoslovakia at transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
8. **Georgia (1993-2003) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established in Georgia at transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
9. **Guinea (2009-2010) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
10. **Guinea-Bissau (2003-2003) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at its second transition from authoritarianism and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
11. **Hungary (1948-1990) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Hungary and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
12. **Indonesia (1967-1999) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Indonesia and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
13. **Kenya (1964-2002) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Kenya and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.

14. **Lesotho (1987-1993) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Lesotho and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
15. **Madagascar (1976-1993) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Madagascar and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
16. **Malawi (1965-1994) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Malawi and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
17. **Mali (1969-1991) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Mali and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
18. **Mongolia (1922-1993) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Mongolia and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
19. **Niger (1997-1999) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Niger and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
20. **Niger (1997-1999) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Niger and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
21. **Pakistan (1978-1988) (post-authoritarian)** No truth commission was established at the time of transition in Niger and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism for the next ten years i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
22. **Pakistan (2000-2008) (post-authoritarian)** Upon its transition from military government in 2008, Pakistan experienced no truth commission and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
23. **Peru - Military (1969-1980) (post-authoritarian)** Upon its transition from military government in 1980, Peru did not establish a truth commission and the outcome was no resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 0)$ , so  $Y_i(1) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.

24. **Poland (1945-1989) (post-authoritarian)** Poland experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
25. **Romania (1946-1989) (post-authoritarian)** Romania experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
26. **Senegal (1961-2000) (post-authoritarian)** Senegal experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
27. **Sudan (1986-1986) (post-authoritarian)** Sudan experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
28. **Taiwan (1950-2000) (post-authoritarian)** Taiwan experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
29. **Turkey (1981-1983) (post-authoritarian)** Turkey experienced no truth commission at its transition and the outcome has been no resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 0$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 0$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
30. **Bangladesh (1983-1990) (post-authoritarian)** Bangladesh experienced no truth commission at its transition from authoritarianism and the outcome has been a resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
31. **Guinea-Bissau (1981-1999) (post-authoritarian)** There was no truth commission established at Bissau's transition from authoritarianism and the outcome has been a resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
32. **Haiti (1989-1990) (post-authoritarian)** Haiti experienced no truth commission at its transition from authoritarianism and the outcome has been a resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.
33. **Niger (1975-1991) (post-authoritarian)** Niger experienced no truth commission at its transition from authoritarianism and the outcome has been a resumption of authoritarianism i.e., ( $Y_i = 0, d_i = 1$ ), or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.


34. **Zambia (1968-1991) (post-authoritarian)** There was no truth commission established at Bissau’s transition from authoritarianism and the outcome has been a resumption of authoritarianism i.e.,  $(Y_i = 0, d_i = 1)$ , or  $Y_i(0) = 1$ . We are unable to make a counterfactual imputation in this case, due to the lack of available information.

## D Robustness Checks

We test the robustness of our assumptions in the procedure’s application to truth commissions by using an alternate specification. We drop the assumption that only completed (and independently conducted) truth commissions are ‘treated’ and truth commissions that were disbanded before their completion are untreated units. Instead, we consider outcomes by assuming that even disbanded truth commission cases reveal their *treated* outcomes or  $Y_i(1)$ . Accordingly, we consider all cases to be treated in Step 1 of our procedural application to truth commissions. Our individual case research from these four cases (Bolivia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Nepal) suggests that these commissions were all disbanded due to a lack of political will and financial resources to investigate past violations. For instance in Nepal, the Truth Commission was originally delayed due to political deadlock, and later struck down by the Supreme Court after its amnesty provisions drew wide resistance from civil society. On the other hand, in the Philippines, the commission was disbanded due to financial constraints along with a lack of leadership and political cooperation. In a situation where these treated units were unable to complete the tasks set out at their establishment, we impute the untreated potential outcome in each case to be the same as observed outcome. In other words  $Y_i(1) = Y_i(0) = 0$  i.e., conflict or authoritarianism would be unlikely to resume even in the absence of a truth commission.

Figure D.1 summarizes our re-calculated extreme value bounds under this assumption. In each case, a change in the assumption leads to no change to the original extreme value bounds or  $Y_i(1) = Y_i(Observed) = Y_i(0) = 0$ .

Figure D.1



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